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PRB OCCASIONAL SERIES: THE CARIBBEAN

Grenada: Yesterday, Today & Tomorrow

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Grenada: Yesterday, Today & Tomorrow

by Leon F. Bouvier
April 1984

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Grenada: Yesterday, Today & Tomorrow

Grenada Yesterday

Grenada is a former French possession that came under the general government of the Windward Islands in 1833. Its first census was taken in 1844, at which time 29,650 persons were enumerated. Since then decennial censuses were held from 1851 through 1921 (see Table 1). No censuses were taken in 1931 and 1941 because of the depression and the war.

Except during the decades 1851–61 and 1911–21, Grenada's population grew consistently over the period 1844–1921. The decline in the 1850s is attributable to a cholera epidemic; high levels of emigration as well as the worldwide influenza epidemic may have been the reasons for the decline after 1910.

By 1901, Grenada's population—63,438—had more than doubled since the first count in 1844. This means that, on average, the population grew by 1.5 percent annually over 51 years. Growth was particularly marked between 1881 and 1911, when the increase amounted to about 25,000 persons.

After 1911, growth came to a halt for all practical purposes, at least until the 1946 census. Between 1911 and 1946 only 5,637 persons were added—an annual rate of growth of only 0.2 percent. As far as population growth is concerned, much of Grenada's growth until World War II occurred before 1900 and in the earlier years of the twentieth century, with little increase noted after 1911.

Although it is not possible to determine rates of fertility and mortality for the nineteenth or early twentieth century, it can be assumed that both were quite high. Crude birth rates of 40–45 per 1,000 population and crude death rates of 25–30 per 1,000 would be normal for that era and region. Net migration was probably not very high either.

By 1921 the crude birth rate was estimated to be 35.1 per 1,000; over the next 25 years it remained in the low to middle 30s, falling to 31.1 by 1945. Death rates remained quite high in this period, ranging from 19.2 to 15.8 (in 1945). As a result, the level of natural increase (that is, births minus deaths) remained about 1.6 percent, even reaching 2 percent in 1931–35 before falling slightly to 1.5 percent by 1945.

Over the 25 years between 1921 and 1946, Grenada grew by 30,132 persons through natural increase (61,169 births and 31,037 deaths). Over the same period, however, the population only increased by 6,085. This suggests substantial emigration of close to 25,000 people, or about 1,000 per year. This level of net emigration is by far the greatest of the Windward Islands. Indeed, it accounts for more than half the total net emigration from the Windwards for that 25–year period.

Thus, over the century or so between 1844 and 1946, it appears that although growth was fairly substantial (29,650 in 1844 to 72,387 in 1946), it would have been

Table 1: Population of Grenada, 1844–1921

Year	Number
1844	29,650
1851	32,671
1861	31,900
1871	37,684
1881	42,403
1891	53,209
1901	63,438
1911	66,750
1921	66,302

Table 2: Population of Grenada and Rates of Birth, Death, and Natural Increase, 1946–70

Year	Population	Crude Birth Rate	Crude Death Rate	Rate of Natural Increase
	(number)	(per 1,0000 population)		(percent)
1946	72,387	32.7	17.0	1.6
1950	76,540*	39.0	13.9	2.5
1955	85,410*	46.3	14.2	3.2
1960	89,960	44.5	11.4	3.3
1970	92,775	28.2	7.5	2.1

*End-of-year estimates developed by Roberts and Harewood.

far greater if emigration had been reduced. Fertility as well as mortality were quite high throughout the 100 years, though both began to fall after 1920. However, net emigration, small at first, grew to extremely large proportions in the twentieth century, particularly between 1921 and 1946.

Presumably numerous Grenadians migrated to the larger islands, such as Trinidad, and to Guyana in addition to moving to Great Britain. Furthermore, as most of the people who moved were men, this undoubtedly contributed to a decline in the fertility rate in the 1940s. As a result of both the high emigration and the declining fertility, the level of actual growth in Grenada as it approached mid-century was very low. The average rate of growth of 0.2 per year between 1921 and 1946 is the lowest of all the Windward Islands.

No censuses were taken between 1946 and 1960. Thanks to noted Caribbean demographers George Roberts and Jack Harewood, however, statistics are available that allow for a more accurate description of the demographic picture of Grenada.* The following section relies on this study for its basic information.

By the 1960 census, Grenada's population had reached 89,960 (see Table 2). This represented an increase of 17,573 since 1946, an average annual rate of growth of 1.5 percent—considerably greater than during the pre-World War II period. This can only be explained by either a higher rate of natural increase or a decline in the level of net emigration.

Crude birth rates went up between 1946 and 1960. In the former year, that rate was 32.7 per 1,000 population, not particularly high for a developing nation. The crude birth rate increased each year through 1955, when it reached 46.3. In 1957 it attained a historical high of 53.5 before falling slightly to 44.5 in 1960. These rates suggest that women were averaging between 6 and 7 children in the post-World War II period, considerably higher than before.

At the same time that fertility rose, mortality fell—from 17.0 per 1,000 population in 1946 to as low as 11.4 in 1960 before leveling off at about 10 per 1,000.

This combination of rising fertility and falling mortality led to a high rate of natural increase. From a rate of 1.6 percent in 1946 it rose to well over 3 percent by the mid-1950s and even topped 4 percent in 1957. By 1960, the rate of natural increase was 3.3 percent. Over the 14-year period there were 47,130 births and 15,280 deaths. Natural increase thus amounted to 31,850.

Since the population increased by only 17,573 between 1946 and 1960, clearly net emigration approximated 14,000, or 1,000 per year. Interestingly, a similar level of net

*G.H. Roberts and Jack Harewood, *Estimates of Intercensal Population by Age and Sex and Revised Vital Rates for British Caribbean Countries, 1946–1960* (University of West Indies, 1964).

emigration was noted for the pre-war period, though for a smaller base population. Thus, the rate of net emigration after World War II fell slightly although the number itself remained quite stable. According to Roberts and Harewood, however, net emigration was fairly low until 1955, when it began to increase considerably, passing 2,000 per year from 1957 to 1960.

Overall, then, the increase in growth noted from 1946 to 1960 was attributable to massive increases in fertility at the same time that mortality fell. Net emigration had the effect of limiting the annual growth to 1.5 percent, particularly in the late 1950s.

Growth was almost nonexistent between 1960 and 1970 (an average annual rate of 0.3 percent). By the latter year, some 92,775 Grenadians were enumerated, an increase of but 2,815 over the ten-year period. The obvious question is: What caused such a low growth?

Both fertility and mortality fell substantially between 1960 and 1970. Every year in the 1960s saw the crude birth rate fall slightly below the preceding year's level. Whereas the rate was 44.5 per 1,000 population in 1960, it was 26.4 in 1969. In 1970 it rose a bit, to 28.2. As might be expected in a country where population growth is minimal, the number of births also declined considerably, from 4,016 in 1960 to 2,649 in 1970. Mortality, too, fell during the 1960s and by 1970 the crude death rate was 7.5 per 1,000—considerably lower than the 11.4 noted ten years earlier.

As a result of declines in both fertility and mortality (though more so in fertility), the rate of natural increase also fell—from 3.3 in 1960 to 2.1 percent by 1970. Nevertheless this still represented a natural growth through more births than deaths of about 24,000 people. These data suggest that the answer to the question posed above is straightforward: Net emigration during the 1960s continued at the level noted in the late 1950s—at about 2,000 people per year.

Thus the longstanding pattern of substantial emigration from Grenada, noted as early as the 1920s, continued at least until 1970 and, as will be noted later, continues in fact to the present day. The proximity of Grenada to Trinidad and Barbados undoubtedly contributed to such movements, fueled by a failure to provide sufficient employment for young adult Grenadians. One final point worth noting is that the rapid decline in fertility in the 1960s may reflect the lack of adult men in the population as much as it does any serious attempt to limit the size of families through family planning.

Grenada Today

It is extremely difficult to analyze recent demographic changes in Grenada. No census was taken in 1980 and the 1982 count remains incomplete. As this report was being completed, the only available information from that census was the total count: 90,821. If both the 1970 and the 1982 censuses are assumed to be comparably complete, this would indicate a loss of about 2,000 people over the last 12 years.

Because of the need for both an age and sex distribution of the population and a 1980 data base from which to make projections of the Grenadian population, estimates of the size and age and sex composition of Grenada in 1980 have been made based on the 1970 and 1982 counts and on information on births and deaths in the interim. This is the most reasonable estimate possible given the paucity of information.

Through the 1970s the crude birth rate remained in the middle to high 20s, reaching a low rate of 22.8 per 1,000 population by 1982. Over the ten years between 1970 and 1980, some 25,000 births occurred. Crude death rates stabilised at around 7 per 1,000, suggesting some 6,500 deaths over the decade.

If it is assumed that net emigration continued at about 2,000 per year, as has been the case since the late 1950s, the total population for 1980 would be about 91,300. Using this as a not unreasonable

Figure 1: Age-Sex Distribution of Grenada, 1980



estimate, the age and sex distribution of the population has been constructed (see Figure 1) based on the information derived on fertility, mortality, and, indirectly, migration.

The drop in fertility, a process that began in the 1960s, was particularly noteworthy in the latter portion of the decade. By 1977, the rate was estimated to be 24.3 per 1,000, and, as noted earlier, by the 1982 census it was down to 22.8, suggesting only about 2,100 births in that year, compared with 2,890 births as recently as 1975.

The unchanging level of mortality is not surprising, given the already-low rate, which is affected more by the young age of the population than by improvements in health conditions. Life expectancy remained at around 65 years at birth in the 1970s.

The massive movement out of Grenada continued throughout the 1970s and possibly reflected the unstable political conditions during most of that decade. In addition, it undoubtedly contributed to the continuing fall in fertility.

Grenada remains a very young nation, demographically speaking. In 1970 its median age was about 16.5 and 47 percent of the population were under the age of 15, while only 5.8 percent were 65 or older. With less than half the population (47.2) being in the so-called active age between 15 and 64, this meant that Grenada had a dependency ratio of 112. That is to say, 112 persons of dependent ages (under 15 or over 64) had to be supported by 100 persons of active age (15–64).

Both high fertility and the emigration of young adults contributed to this situation. Although the 1980 age composition is an

estimate, if it approximates reality the median age went up to about 18 years while the proportion under 15 fell to 41.5 percent and that of the elderly remained at 5.8 percent. The decline in the proportion of youth reflects the lower fertility noted in the 1970s. As a result, the dependency ratio dropped to 90 per 100 persons of active age.

The population of Grenada has hardly changed since 1960; to a considerable extent this can be attributed to very high levels of net emigration. It remains to be seen if such a pattern continues. Economic problems, political unrest, and the proximity of more-advanced islands undoubtedly contributed to the emigration.

Furthermore, the United States has become an increasingly attractive place for Grenadians to move to, particularly following the changes in U.S. immigration laws after 1965. From a mere 361 legal immigrants in 1970, the number entering the country rose to about 1,000 per year beginning in 1977. Over the decade 6,896 Grenadians migrated to the United States legally (see Table 3).

The remainder of this report considers how population size and composition could change in future years as a result of possible variations in the patterns of fertility, mortality, and migration.

Table 3: Permanent Grenadian-Born Immigrants Admitted to the United States, 1960–80

Year	Number
1960–64	590
1965–69	1,707
1970–74	2,149
1975	568
1976	787
1977	1,240
1978	1,206
1979	946
1980	1,198

Grenada Tomorrow

Population size as well as age composition can change only through variations in three demographic variables: fertility, mortality, and migration. In Grenada there has been scant change in population size (though some alterations in age composition) over the past 20–25 years because net emigration has almost always equaled natural increase.

What would occur to the population in future years if changes did take place in fertility and particularly in migration patterns? Alternative population projections have been developed in an effort to address this particular question. It should be emphasized that these are projections and not predictions. They only reflect the assumptions upon which they are constructed.

Demographic Assumptions: The current total fertility rate for Grenada is estimated to be about 3.5. That is to say, women on the average have 3.5 live births throughout their reproductive years. As fertility has fallen steadily over the past decade, it seems unlikely that the rate will rise in the near future, although this remains a possibility.

One assumption used in this report is that fertility continues at its current level. Two other fertility assumptions are considered: that the rate falls to 2.8 by 1990, remaining at that level thereafter, and that it falls to 2.1 by 1990 and does not change after that date. A decline from 3.5 to 2.8 by 1990 is not impossible; similarly rapid drops have occurred in Costa Rica and Barbados, for example. A fall to 2.1 is unrealistic but is used for illustrative purposes.

Currently life expectancy at birth in Grenada is about 63 for males and 67 for females. It is assumed that slight progress will be made and that by 2000 life expectancy will be 68 for females and 65 for males. This is the only mortality assumption considered in these projections.

Three net emigration assumptions have been selected for use in this report. One

Figure 2: Population of Grenada, 1980–2030



A: TFR of 3.5, net emigration of 1,800
B: TFR of 3.5, net emigration of 900
C: TFR of 2.8, net emigration of 900
D: TFR of 2.1, net migration of zero

considers a continuation of present levels, here assumed to be about 1,800 per year—somewhat lower than noted through the 1970s, but perhaps closer to the actual current situation in the mid-1980s.

A second postulates net emigration is halved, to 900 per year. Such a development is certainly possible given the increasing reluctance of the traditional receiving countries to accept more immigrants. Finally, for illustrative purposes, zero net migration is also considered.

Based on these many assumptions about fertility, mortality, and migration behaviour, four different scenarios about the future size and composition of the Grenadian population have been prepared (see Figure 2; for supporting data, see Appendix Table A):

Scenario A–current fertility (3.5) and current net emigration (1,800 per year)

Scenario B–current fertility (3.5) and half the current net emigration (900 per year)

Scenario C–declining fertility (2.8) and half the current net emigration (900 per year)

Scenario D–declining fertility (2.1) and net migration of zero.

Population Projections: Under Scenario A, which assumes a continuation of current patterns of fertility and net emigration, Grenada's population would begin to decline slightly by 1990. By the turn of the century, it would reach 88,624, and by 2030, the figure would be close to 71,000. Fertility is low enough (3.5 live births per woman) and net emigration is high enough that further growth would not occur in Grenada. This would represent a continuation of the situation since 1970, as the 1982 census enumerated fewer people than were counted 12 years earlier.

For at least a quarter of a century Grenada has exhibited the highest level of net emigration in the East Caribbean. Will such levels continue in future years? As noted earlier, many receiving nations might erect ever more rigid barriers against entry by foreigners, as the United Kingdom has done. The government of Trinidad and Tobago has expressed concern about the large number of illegal immigrants in that country, some of them Grenadians. Barbados, too, is increasingly anxious over immigration from the smaller Windward Islands. Finally, both Canada and the United States are reviewing their immigration laws, with possible reductions in the offing.

Scenario B looks at what would occur in Grenada if net emigration were cut in half, to 900 per year, while fertility remained at its present moderate level of 3.5. The population would grow and by the turn of the century there would be 115,338 Grenadians; 30 years later, they would number over 165,000 and would still be increasing. At that time the rate of growth would be 1.1 percent per year, meaning an additional doubling of the population in 65 years if that rate did not change.

Such growth, while considerable, is not a cause for alarm—at least not for the immediate future. Nevertheless, Scenario B illustrates the tremendous impact of net emigration on the size, and, as will be seen later, the age composition of Grenada's population. Simply lowering net emigration by 900 per year means a difference of 27,000 people by the year 2000, and nearly 100,000 people by 2030.

Although not shown in these tables and figures, a total elimination of net emigration, combined with a continuation of current fertility, would yield a population of 142,000 by century's end and 260,000 by 2030! If fertility remains at approximately 3.5 live births per woman for the foreseeable future, it is critical that net emigration be kept at close to 1,000 per year if growth is to be kept fairly slow.

The first two scenarios concentrated on alternative levels of net emigration. Fertility, too, could change in the future. Although it might increase again, it is more likely that it would decline. If the growth under Scenario B is deemed too high, what fertility level is needed to counteract reduced net emigration and assure slower growth?

Scenario C examines the outcome of a decline in fertility to 2.8 live births per woman by 1990 combined with a reduction of net emigration from 1800 to 900 per year. The population of Grenada would increase to 107,910 by 2000 and to over 126,000 by 2030, after which any further growth would be minimal. Thus should net emigration show signs of declining in the years ahead, a reduction in fertility to 2.8 or thereabouts might be advisable if rapid population growth is not considered in the best interests of the country.

Scenario D, though based on an unrealistic fertility level, has been constructed to illustrate the built-in momentum for growth in a young population that has recently exhibited relatively high fertility. Even if the total fertility rate fell to 2.1 live births per woman and net migration was zero, Grenada's population would still grow to 124,402 by 2000 and to nearly 162,000 by 2030.

How can a population almost double in size when its fertility is at the replacement level? (This scenario is based on 2.1 live births, the number needed to replace a population in the long run in the absence of migration.) As noted earlier, Grenada has a young population. The generation of young people is so large that as they pass through their reproductive years, even if the women average only 2.1 live births, the number of births will remain large for at least two generations before leveling off. Indeed, it would be 2040 before population stabilised in Grenada at 165,000. This built-in momentum for growth suggests that it is almost impossible to put an end to growth in the absence of emigration.

Numerically speaking, population growth does not appear to present a serious problem in Grenada in the future. If current conditions remain unchanged, the island's population will decline ever so slowly. However, any significant drop in net

Table 4: Percent Distribution of Population by Age-Group in Grenada, 1980–2030

Scenario	1980	1990	2000	2010	2020	2030
Scenario A						
Under 15	41	41	37	36	35	34
15–64	53	53	57	58	57	55
65 or older	6	6	6	6	8	11
Scenario B						
Under 15	41	39	37	35	34	33
15–64	53	55	58	61	61	59
65 or older	6	6	5	4	5	8
Scenario C						
Under 15	41	38	32	31	28	27
15–64	53	56	63	64	65	63
65 or older	6	6	5	5	7	10
Scenario D						
Under 15	41	36	27	25	23	21
15–64	53	59	68	70	71	68
65 or older	6	5	5	5	6	11

emigration might warrant a decline in fertility if growth is considered too rapid for the benefit of the nation.

Age Distribution: In examining the 1970–80 changes, it was noted that population varies in age composition as well as in numbers. This will be the case in the future as well, of course, and age distribution will vary according to the scenario followed.

According to the estimates developed for this report, 41 percent of the population in 1980 were under 15, 53 percent were between 15 and 64, and 6 percent were 65 or older (see Table 4). Under Scenario A, by the turn of the century the proportion of youth would have fallen to 37 percent while that between 15 and 64 would have grown to 57 percent. The elderly proportion would not change.

The increasing proportion in the active ages reflects the higher fertility of the 1960s and 1970s compared with the lower fertility anticipated for the 1980s and 1990s. After 2020, although the percent who are young would continue to fall, this would be less because of increases in the active population than it would be because of growth in the elderly group, which by 2030 would represent 11 percent of the population of Grenada.

Under Scenario B, fewer young adults would leave the island. Thus, the proportion 15–64 would be somewhat higher than under Scenario A, and the growth of the elderly population, proportionately speaking, would not be as dramatic. In this scenario, by 2000 the proportions would be 37 percent for youth, 58 percent at active age, and 5 percent elderly, hardly any different than under A. By 2030, however, the proportions would be 33, 59, and 8, respectively.

The lower fertility assumed under Scenario C would result in some fairly significant shifts in age distribution. The proportion under 15 would begin to fall while that of the 15–64 age-group would grow over time. Indeed the proportion under 15 would be 32 percent in 2000 and only 27 percent in 2030. Although the elderly proportion would increase, its share of the total numbers would be about the same as in other scenarios. The active population would increase however.

Figure 3: School-Age Population (5–14) in Grenada, 1980–2030



A: TFR of 3.5, net emigration of 1,800
B: TFR of 3.5, net emigration of 900
C: TFR of 2.8, net emigration of 900
D: TFR of 2.1, net migration of zero

As a result, the dependency ratio in 2000 under Scenario C would be only 58 "dependents" per 100 "active" persons, compared with 75 under Scenario A. This illustrates the positive impact of a decline in fertility. With fewer people under 15, the problem of dependency is considerably alleviated.

Changes in the proportional distribution of a population are important for policymakers, particularly in the long run. Perhaps even more important are the numerical changes that result from the variations in fertility and migration. Of particular relevance are school enrollments, the number of people in the labour force, and the population that reaches the retirement stage of life.

School Enrollment: Actual statistics on school enrollments by age are not available for Grenada at this time. By using the total population between the ages of 5 and 14 as a surrogate, however, a fairly reliable estimate of changes in school enrollments can be made. According to this report's estimates for 1980, the population 5–14 numbered 23,128. Irrespective of scenario, little change can be expected over the next 20 years (see Figure 3; for supporting data, see Appendix Table B). Indeed, except under Scenario B, Grenada can assume no further increases in its school enrollments for the next 50 years at present rates. (Scenario D has not been included in this and the following sections because it is unlikely to occur.)

If net emigration is reduced while fertility remains at its current level (Scenario B), the number of persons 5–14 would increase to 26,918 in 2010 and to over 35,000 by 2030. On the other hand, if fertility is reduced to 2.8 and emigration is halved (Scenario C), the school-age population, after peaking

Figure 4: Labour Force in Grenada, 1980–2030



in 1990, would fall to less than 23,000 by 2030.

Perhaps most realistic is a continuation of the current demographic situation (Scenario A). After a slight increase to 25,057 in 1990, the school-age group would fall quite steadily, reaching less than 17,000 in 2030.

Grenada is in a fortunate position insofar as its educational system is concerned. Any substantial growth will not take place until the next century, if at all. In the meantime, this lack of growth in numbers could allow the nation to improve the quality of its educational institutions as well as to encourage continued enrollment among older children.

Labour Force: In this report, the International Labour Office's projections for the Windward Islands' rates of labour force participation have been used. All persons working or looking for work are included. Regardless of the scenario selected, more jobs will have to be created at least for the next 30 years just to maintain the current level of unemployment, which may well approach 20 percent.

Looking first at Scenario A—that is, examining the consequences of a continuation of current demographic behaviour—about 3,000 jobs would have to be created within the next 20 years (see Figure 4; for supporting data, see Appendix Table C). Currently an estimated 6,000 persons are unemployed out of a labour force of 30,752. If the unemployment rate remains constant, this means that by the year 2000 some 6,700 persons would be out of work but looking for a job out of a labour force of 33,760. Underemployment is not considered in this analysis. After the turn of the century, the size of the labour force would begin to fall slightly and by 2030 it would

Figure 5: Elderly Population (65 or Older) in Grenada, 1980–2030



be under 27,000, about 4,000 less than estimated in 1980.

Interestingly, the labour force would grow until the year 2000 while the overall population could be decreasing. This reflects the large cohort of people born prior to 1970 who will reach working age over the next few years. Even if fertility falls substantially in the future, the size of the generation now entering the labour force will not be affected, for these people are already born.

Any decline in net emigration would pose major economic problems insofar as employment is concerned. Under both Scenario B and Scenario C, the number in the labour force would grow to 46,161 by the year 2000—about 16,000 more than estimated for 1980. Close to 10,000 people could be unemployed if current levels continue to that year.

After the year 2000 the number of persons in the labour force would be smaller under Scenario C, simply because by that time the lower fertility assumed would be reflected in the number of adults. Indeed, by 2030, the difference in the size of the labour force between Scenarios B and C would be a not inconsequential 12,000 persons.

In sum, Grenada must accept the fact that it will witness some growth in its labour force at least until the turn of the century. Should net emigration be reduced, the problem will take on significant proportions. Either way, it is a matter to consider as Grenada faces the future.

The Elderly: In 1980, there were an estimated 5,250 people who were 65 years of age or older. Until 2010 that number will remain fairly stable irrespective of scenario (see Figure 5; for supporting data,

see Appendix Table D). In 2010, the elderly population would range from 4,984 under A to 5,597 under B and C. (There is no difference between B and C as the assumed migration level is the same. Future changes in fertility can only affect the size of the elderly population after the year 2045.)

After 2010, however, the number of older islanders would surge, particularly if net emigration is reduced. Even with a continuation of current demographic behaviour the number would top 8,000 in 50 years.

The growth of the elderly population after 2010 irrespective of scenario reflects the high fertility that occurred in the mid-twentieth century. These are the people born around 1950 and 1960, when fertility was higher, who will have survived to reach retirement age by 2020 and 2030.

That there will be many elderly in the population and that they will comprise a fairly large proportion of the population is almost certain. What is important is that policymakers be aware of this and begin to make plans for the increased costs involved with growing numbers of older residents.

Conclusion: Insofar as future population size is concerned, Grenada appears to be in a favourable position. If present demographic behaviour is maintained, growth will soon end. Even if net emigration declines somewhat, growth should not be an insurmountable problem.

Nevertheless, changes in age composition will pose significant problems for years to come, problems that can be traced to the past demographic behaviour of Grenadians. The increase in the size of the labour force as well as the later increase in the number of elderly are issues that must be addressed if Grenada is to survive the next 50 years without serious social difficulties.

Appendices

Table A: Current and Projected Population of Grenada, 1980–2030

Scenario	1980	1990	2000	2010	2020	2030
A	91,300	89,950	88,624	85,490	80,038	71,420
B	91,300	101,263	115,338	130,782	147,675	165,650
C	91,300	99,742	107,910	116,293	122,731	126,361
D	91,300	109,497	124,402	140,340	153,325	161,703

A: TFR of 3.5, net emigration of 1,800
B: TFR of 3.5, net emigration of 900
C: TFR of 2.8, net emigration of 900
D: TFR of 2.1, net migration of zero

Table B: Current and Projected School-Age Population (5–14) in Grenada, 1980–2030

Scenario	1980	1990	2000	2010	2020	2030
A	23,128	25,057	21,625	20,982	18,675	16,492
B	23,128	26,148	26,918	30,150	32,027	35,349
C	23,128	26,148	22,550	23,863	23,416	22,756
D	23,128	27,209	22,283	23,330	23,587	22,590

Table C: Current and Projected Labour Force in Grenada, 1980–2030

Scenario	1980	1990	2000	2010	2020	2030
A	30,752	31,382	33,760	32,929	30,641	26,774
B	30,752	37,265	46,161	53,477	60,949	67,576
C	30,752	37,265	46,161	51,443	54,410	55,303
D	30,752	42,963	58,533	69,640	75,532	78,040

Table D: Current and Projected Elderly Population (65 or Older) in Grenada, 1980–2030

Scenario	1980	1990	2000	2010	2020	2030
A	5,250	5,810	5,566	4,984	6,491	8,006
B and C	5,250	5,812	5,743	5,597	8,122	12,589
D	5,250	5,814	5,934	6,217	9,751	17,173

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